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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ll & R SUPPLY COMPANY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

J. M. BRINGHURST and
LEO BRINGHURST,
Defendants and Appellants.

12805

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts as stated in the Appellants' Brief are
substantially correct, but additional facts should be reviewed to get a full and accurate picture.
In examining the exhibits (pp. 9-15; Exhibits A
through J of Record) it will be noticed that the first
purchases of plumbing supplies on open account were
made by LSB (the initials of Appellant Leo Bring-
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hurst). The subsequent purchases were made by the
employ:ees of the appellants who were journeymen
plumbers and had the authority to pick up and receive
the supplies or purchase them on open account.

POINT I
THE EMPLOYEES OF THE APPELLANTS
HAD APPARENT AND IMPLIED AUTHORITY TO BIND THEIR PRINCIPAL TO THE
INVOICE AGREEMENT FOR PAYMENT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN COLLECTING THE PAST DUE PURCHASE
PRICES OF THE PLUMBING SUPPLIES.

ARGUMENT
In Farm & Auto Supply, an Arizona corporation,
doing business as Farm Service & Auto Supply, et al,
v. Phoenix Fuel Company, Inc., an Arizona corporation, 103 Arix. 344, 442 p2d ( 1968), the Supreme Court
of Arizona, it is stated:
"we hold that where none of the invoices containing provisions in regards to attorney's fees
were signed by the buyer and it is not proved
that the employees who signed the invoices had
authority to make such an agreement in regard
to attorney's fees, the mere signing by such
employees of such invoices does not constitu~e
a binding contract for the buyer to pay attorneys
fees as provided in the invoices."
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The facts in this case were very similar to the
facts we have before us and the issue to be determined
by the Court was whether the buyer was liable for
attorney fees where seller had agreed to sell merchandise on credit. The distinguishing point in the Arizona
case is that none of the invoices were signed by the
buyer, only the buyer's agent.
In the facts we have before us, we have invoices
representing purchases made by the Appellant buyers
in the approximate sum of $500.00 and there is no
doubt that they would be responsible for attorney fees
on these invoices. The appellants have admitted that
their employees, who were journeymen plumbers, had
the authority to pick up and receive the supplies or
purchase them on open account. Since many of the first
purchases were made by the Appellants themselves, it
would be logical for the respondent to rely on the Appellant's agents to buy on credit and to bind their
principals to pay reasonable attorney fees if they defaulted on the agreement.
It is stated in 2 Corpus Juris Secundum, Agency,
§114, the following:

"An agent whose employment is only for the
making of a specific purchase, or is specifically
restricted to purchases for cash, or otherwise
excludes by its terms any power to buy on credit,
may not, in the absence of anything to give rise
to an implication or appearance of a broader
authority, buy upon any other terms than cash
payment at the time of the sale; hence the rule
has been laid down that a mere agency to pur-
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chase does not imply authority to pledge the
principal's credit for purchases made; and, a
fortiori, one who is not an agent at all, or at any
rate not an agent to purchase, has no power to
buy on credit. An agent whose authority derives
from a written agreement to deal only for cash
has no actual authority to purchase in any other
manner.
However, as the power of a general purchasing agent extends in the absence of operative
restrictions to allow of his purchasing in whatever manner and on whatever terms are usual
and reasonably necessary to the doing of the
business confided to him, such an agent may ordinarily purchase for cash or credit in his dis- '
cretion where both methods are commonly used
in the particular line of business; and the nature
and character of the service to be rendered by
the agent will carry with it, as an incident to
his agency, implied authority to bind the credit
of his principal whenever purchasing in such a
fashion is a necessary and appropriate means, 1
under the circumstances, to accomplish the purposes of the agency, or is the well established
and customary method of dealing in that connection. A power to purchase on credit is implied
more readily and upon slighter circumstances
than is power to borrow or to issue commercial '
paper. Whether a general managing or supervising agent in charge of a business, for instance,
has implied authority to purchase stock, supplies, or equipment therefor on the owner's
credit depends largely on the character and
necessities of the business and the customs and
usages relative thereto; whenever it is common
for one possessed of such a managerial status as
that in which the agent is placed to make such
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purchases, he has the requisite authority, and,
if such contracts are not usual or customary, no
such authority is to be implied from the position
of the agent. Where the agent has actual authority to buy on credit, the fact that the principal
does not know that a particular purchase was
made by the agent on his credit, or the fact that
the seller is not informed of the agency except
by the statement of the agent, is not fatal to
the validity of the purchase.
Aside from the agent's actual authority, express or implied, the rule is well recognized that
apparent authority to purchase on credit exists
when the principal by words or conduct represents to those with whom the agent deals that
he possesses such power, or acquiesces in his
exercise of it, and they sell to him with whom
the agent deals that he possesses such power,
or acquiesces in his exercise of it, and they sell
to him with knowledge of, and in reliance on,
the principal's conduct creating the appearance
of power. The requisite elements of ostensible
authority must exist, however, in this as in any
other case, and hence the apeparance of authority
to purchase must be found in the principal's acts
or conduct, not in a mere assumption or assertion
of power by the agent, and the seller must have
acted in reliance on such appearance of power."

CONCLUSION
The Appellants' employees had the authority to
pick up and purchase plumbing supplies on open account, they also had the apparent authority to purchase
on credit and bind their principal to the terms of the
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invoice agreement. The Appellants themselves had
purchased merchandise on open account and had
entered into the invoice agreement and the Respondent
relied on their conduct and their employees had the
same power to purchase plumbing supplies and enter
into the invoice agreement. Therefore, judgment of
the District Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ALAN D. FRANDSEN
363 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84lll

Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
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